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Multilateral Treaties: An Assessment of
the Concept of Laterality*
BY JOHN KING GAMBLE, JR.**
with the assistance of
Joy BILHARZ KOLB***
I. INTRODUCTION
There can be no doubt that treaties form an absolutely essen-
tial part of the fabric of modern international law. If anything, the
predominance of treaties over custom has increased in the fifty
years since Manley 0. Hudson remarked that multilateral treaties
are the hope of mankind.1 At the outset it is desirable to acknow-
ledge the perspective taken here and in companion pieces.2 Most
international legal research approaches treaties in a decidedly mi-
croscopic way. In fact, most international legal research focuses ei-
ther on a single treaty or, at most, on a small group of treaties. The
contention here is not that these microscopic studies are not use-
ful; quite the contrary, they have contributed significantly to an
understanding of international law. But in order to have a thor-
ough understanding of treaties, one must combine macroscopic and
microscopic approaches. This article falls decidedly into the mac-
roscopic category. Of course, macroscopic and microscopic ap-
proaches, while intellectually complementary, to a degree compete
with each other. For example, a study such as this which looks at
the totality of post-World War II multilateral treatymaking cannot
look in detail at many individual treaties. In a sense, the detail
* A grant from The Behrend College Research and Scholarly Activities Fund facilitated
the completion of this research.
** B.A. College of Wooster (Ohio); M.A. University of Washington; Ph.D. University of
Washington. Head of the Division of Social and Behaviorial Sciences and Associate Profes-
sor of Political Science, The Behrend College, Pennsylvania State University.
*** B.A. George Washington University; M.A. Bryn Mawr College. Lecturer in Sociol-
ogy and Anthropology at Mercyhurst College.
1. INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATON AT XVI (M. Hudson ed. 1931).
2. See Gamble, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State
Practice, 74 Am. J. INT'L L. 372 (1980), and Gamble, Multilateral Treaties: The Signifi-
cance of the Name of the Instrument, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Multilat-
eral Treaties].
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generic to most legal research must be sacrificed.
An aspect of treaties that has received little critical attention
is laterality. But there can be no questioning its importance. The
most basic questions about any treaty are what is its content and
who are the parties. Since content obviously disposes parties, it
could be argued that parties are the most important aspect of trea-
ties. It is surprising and disturbing that most analyses of treaties
distinguish only between bilateral and multilateral treaties. Ac-
cording to most definitions, multilateral treaties consist of those
treaties having anywhere from three to 160 parties. Even the most
cursory examination of treaties then suggests that two such catego-
ries are inadequate.
Before surveying some of the literature about laterality, it is
necessary to discuss matters of terminology. It has been pointed
out, quite accurately, that the designation "laterality" might refer
both to the nature of the obligation created by a treaty and to the
number of parties to the treaty. Fenwick, among others, felt that
laterality should refer to the obligations created and that partite is
the proper term for the number of states participating. 8 Lord
McNair showed sensitivity both for the way terms should be used
and the way they have come to be used in the lexicon of interna-
tional law:
Likewise, the term 'multilateral treaty' should denote one con-
taining three or more 'sides' or 'parties' in this sense and creating
obligations between each possible pair or some of them. Never-
theless, as the terms 'bipartite' and 'multipartite' cannot be said
to be fully domiciled in the vocabulary of international law, and
the terms bilateral and multilateral are constantly used to denote
treaties made between two or many parties regardless of their
content. ..
In order to remain consistent with common usage, this article will
use "laterality" to mean the number of parties, not the number of
obligations. However it must be acknowledged that the arguments
about different uses of the term laterality are valid.
The approach to laterality taken here will proceed on several
fronts. First, the literature on the subject will be surveyed to illus-
trate that most approaches to laterality oversimplify reality. Se-
cond, a classification system (typology) will be suggested based on
3. C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 518 (4th ed. 1965).
4. LORD McNAiR, THE LAW OF TwxTms 30 (1961).
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an exhaustive examination of all multilateral treaties entering into
force between 1945 and 1972. Third, this typology will be related
to other important treaty characteristics to see what patterns and
trends exist. This analysis will be limited to multilateral treaties.
Bilateral treaties, having exactly two parties, do not suffer the dis-
tortion characteristic of multilateral treaties when placed in a sin-
gle category; thus they are excluded from further discussion.
II. APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF LATERALITY
One is immediately struck by the fact that most scholarly
literature acknowledges only two categories of treaties defined by
laterality: bilateral and multilateral. A few examples will suffice.
Hodges remarked that bilateral treaties involved two parties while
multilateral treaties "may involve large numbers of states."6 The
impression here is striking; bilateral treaties are strictly deter-
mined, while multilaterals are permitted to vary, presumably the
only limit being the total number of states. Fawcett made a similar
point while dwelling at some length on the distinction between
laterality and partite.6 One would imagine that such concern for
detail would preclude lumping all multilateral treaties together in
a single category. Interestingly, the Harvard Research on Interna-
tional Law paid considerable heed to the fact that at least two
States must be involved to satisfy the definition of a treaty; but it
attempted no distinction as the number of parties increased be-
yond two.
7
There is general agreement among scholars that the name of
the instrument of a treaty has no legal significance. 8 In spite of this
admission, many authorities engage in considerable discussion on
the various instrument names and neglect laterality which, by defi-
nition, has clear legal importance because it controls the number of
States that can be bound by a treaty. A good example here is Gam-
boa who stated "[b]ilateral treaties are those concluded between
two countries, multilateral treaties [are] those concluded between
several countries."9 Thus a potentially important issue is dis-
missed. Nor does Soviet scholarship attempt any distinction:
5. HODGES, THE BACKGROUND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 (1932).
6. J. FAWCETr, THE LAW OF NATIONS 92 (1968).
7. Research in International Law, under the auspices of the faculty of the Harvard
Law School, 29 Am. J. Irr'L L. Supp. 1, 691 (1935).
8. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 2.
9. M. GAMBOA, A DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 258 (1973).
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"[t]he term 'treaty' included the most varied inter-State compacts
both bilateral and multilateral (peace treaties, trade treaties,
etc.)."'10 However, this formulation does have the advantage of ac-
knowledging the diversity of the entities collected under the rubric
"treaty." One finds a similar statement in other works, among
them Leech" and Schwarzenberger. 12 Some indication of the de-
gree to which such approaches oversimplify reality is provided by
Jacobini who, after describing all these matters, noted "the most
significant statement that can be made about such classifications is
that for the most part they are of limited usefulness."'
Almost any issue dealing with treaties can be illuminated by
looking at the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 14
While this treaty is not yet in force,"5 it does provide a clear indi-
cation of community thinking and expectations about this impor-
tant aspect of international law. In analyzing the Vienna Conven-
tion, one can look at scholarly works about the conference that
produced the treaty as well as at specific provisions of the treaty
itself. Shabtai Rosenne's detailed study of the work of the Vienna
Conference noted that many different, more comprehensive desig-
nations on the basis of laterality were contemplated in the negoti-
ating process including plurilateral treaty, treaty in simplified
form, general multilateral treaty, and restricted multilateral
treaty. 6 Most of these were discarded long before intensive final
negotiations began on March 26, 1968.17
T.O. Elias' excellent analysis of the work of the Vienna Con-
ference addressed the problem well. Elias felt the problem is one of
precision, i.e., exactly how many parties are possible under various
formulations."' At the Vienna Conference the Syrian delegation
10. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNION OF SoviEr SOCIALIST REPUBLICS' INSTITuTE OF
STATE AND LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEXTBOOK FOR USE IN LAW SCHOOLS 250 (D. Ogden
trans. 1960).
11. N. LEECH, C. OLIVER, J. SWEENEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LE-
GAL SYsTEM 929 (1973).
12. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1965).
13. H. JACOBINI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEXT 117 (1968).
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (May 23,
1969), reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) (hereinafter Vienna Convention].
15. At present the Convention needs two more parties to enter into force. See Briggs,
United States Ratification of the Vienna Treaty Convention, 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 470 (1979).
16. S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TEATIES: A GUIME TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
VIENNA CoNVENnoN 112 (1970).
17. T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 6 (1974).
18. Id. at 14.
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proposed a definition that would have distinguished a general mul-
tilateral treaty from other multilaterals:
A 'general multilateral treaty' means a multilateral treaty which
relates to general norms of international law or deals with matters
of general interest to the international community at large...19
An attempt to add such a provision to the draft treaty failed.
2 0
Another specific proposal, endorsed by twenty-two States, read as
follows:
Every State has the right to participate in a multilateral treaty
which codifies or progressively develops norms of general interna-
tional law or the object and purpose of which are of interest to
the international community of States as a whole.2 1
Elias also noted that an attempt was made to define a restricted
multilateral treaty:
'Restricted multilateral treaty' means a treaty which is intended
to be binding only on the States referred to in the treaty and
whose entry into force in its entirety with respect to all the nego-
tiating States is an essential condition of the consent of each of
them to be bound by it."2
The Conference did not approve any of these proposals because
they would further complicate the text of the Convention.' Thus
it is not surprising that the text of the treaty finally adopted by
the Vienna Conference paid little heed to the matter of laterality.
Probably the most significant thing about the Vienna Conven-
tion concerning laterality is its relative silence on the matter.
There is almost no attempt to address the unique characteristics
of treaties with more than two parties. In fact, the form of the
convention and terminology adopted clearly show that bilateral
treaties were at the forefront of concern of those drafting the docu-
ment. For example, Article 2(1)(a) states "'treaty' means an inter-
national agreement concluded between states in written form."
' 4
Article 2(1)(h) reads "'third state' means a state not party to the
treaty.""5 This illustrates the pronounced bilateral orientation of





24. Vienna Convention, supra note 14, at Art. 2(1)(a).
25. Id. Art. 2(1)(h).
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the text, although multilateral treaties are surely not excluded.
Nevertheless one wonders why the definition did not read "be-
tween or among states."
No section of the Vienna Convention deals expressly with
multilateral treaties as a special type of treaty. In fact, even those
areas one would expect to apply principally to multilateral treaties
treat multilaterals only as a special case.' One is struck by the fact
that most of the Vienna Convention seems to be aimed primarily
at bilateral treaties and secondarily at general multilateral treaties.
For example, Article 41 states "two or more of the parties to a
multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the
treaty as between themselves alone. . . .,2 Of course, the condi-
tions under which such modification can occur are clearly spelled
out. But it is difficult to imagine a case where a trilateral treaty
would fit this contingency. Article 55 states "[u]nless the treaty
otherwise provides, a multilateral treaty does not terminate by rea-
son only of the fact that the number of the parties falls below the
number necessary for its entry into force. '2 Again, such a provi-
sion seems to be aimed at multilateral treaties open to all States.
The point to be emphasized is that the Vienna Convention as the
definitive document on the law of treaties provides absolutely no
help in drawing distinctions based on laterality. The principal fo-
cus of the treaty seems to have been bilateral treaties with little
attention given to general multilateral treaties. No significant at-
tention was paid to the fact that there may be many separate cate-
gories of treaties between bilaterals and general multilaterals open
to all States and that different types of law might be appropriate
for these intermediate types.
Fortunately there are a few instances in the scholarly litera-
ture where a need was perceived for a more rigorous classificatory
system for treaties, a system that admits gradations of laterality.
One has the impression that those experts whose research necessi-
tated actually dealing with large numbers of multilateral treaties
immediately sensed that a single category for every multilateral
treaty was inadequate. A good example is Triska and Slusser's ex-
haustive examination of the treaty practice of the Soviet Union.
They found that Soviet treaties divide clearly into bilateral, multi-
26. Vienna Convention, supra note 14. See, e.g., Part IV on Amendment and
Modification.
27. Id. Art. 41.
28. Id. Art. 55.
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lateral and plurilateral treaties.2 9 Furthermore, they take the radi-
cal tact of counting each variety of multilateral treaty, finding
slightly more than two hundred of each.30 But the point to be em-
phasized is that single categories were utterly unsatisfactory to de-
scribe Soviet treaty behavior. Treaties involving more than two
parties but restricted in scope by subject matter and/or geography
are termed "plurilateral;" those treaties open to any State are
more accurately termed general multilateral.31
One of the best discussions of what constitutes a plurilateral
as opposed to a general treaty was provided by S~rensen:
Nevertheless certain multilateral treaties, entered into by a small
group of states and dealing with matters in relation to which the
particular position of each party has been taken into account in
the framing of the treaty, remain in their legal effect very like
bilateral treaties. An example of a multilateral treaty which is, in
the sense explained, scarcely distinguishable from a bilateral
treaty, is the Convention signed at Paris on 18 April 1951, setting
up the European Coal and Steel Community, which was ex-
pressed to come into force only after ratification by all signatories
(Art. 99) and to which other states may accede only after fresh
negotiations have suited the special conditions for such accession
(Art. 98). The distinction between the two categories attains its
true significance only when account is taken of that class of mul-
tilateral instruments which are termed 'collective treaties' or 'gen-
eral multilateral treaties'. . . . These are treaties, commonly
signed by a substantial number of states, which are open to acces-
sion by others and which are designed to lay down general rules
applicable independently of the numbers or political magnitude
of the parties. Instances of 'collective treaties' are innumerable.
They relate to matters as diverse as the prevention and punish-
ment of genocide, the regime of the high seas, the drug traffic,
and the protection of copyright. Not all of them, however, are of
universal application. Many have merely a regional scope, such as
the Pan American codification conventions. 2
S~rensen's views are clearly on the right track, but certain of his
distinctions are very difficult to apply. It is hard to determine
whether and how rules created by a treaty are independent of the
29. J. TRisKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIs 4
(1962).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 215.
32. A MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 125-126 (M. S~rensen ed. 1968).
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number of participants in the treaty. Sorensen seems to have
sensed the difficulty when~he retreated by saying that all such trea-
ties are not of universal applicability.
33
One of the better definitions of a plurilateral treaty was
presented by Bot who wrote that plurilateral treaties are "instru-
ments open to a restricted number of parties . . . deal(ing) with
matters of concern only to such parties."'" But it must be acknowl-
edged that most authorities fail to make much of laterality-based
distinctions. Even Mostecky and Doyle's Index to Multilateral
Treaties, which one would expect to address the matter, hardly
touches the subject." Many writers, among them Hungdah Chiu,
seem preoccupied with tying laterality to the number of obligations
created as opposed to the number of parties. s Laterality, when
viewed this way, is no doubt important, but it is difficult to apply.
Furthermore, it does nothing to address the important problem of
categorizing treaties on the basis of the number of parties or, more
precisely, how participation in treaties is controlled or regulated.
III. A SUGGESTED TYPOLOGY OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES
It must be acknowledged that multilateral treaties can be
grouped according to many criteria, only one of which is laterality.
An inductive examination of all multilateral treaties might suggest
categories based on laterality. The approach here is to try to iso-
late several major categories into which most multilateral treaties
fall. In this section, the major categories will be explained and il-
lustrated. Subsequent sections will address these laterality-deter-
mined categories in relation to other treaty characteristics. Of
course, it must be borne in mind that laterality, as defined in this
article, means only the number of parties to a treaty, or, in the
alternative, the ways in which participation in a treaty is limited or
not limited. It is not surprising that two broad categories of multi-
lateral treaties are evident, multilateral treaties and plurilateral
treaties.
A careful examination of all multilateral treaties7 contained
33. Id. at 126.
34. B. BoT, NON-RECOGNITION AND TREATY RELATIONS 105 (1968).
35. INDEX TO MULTILATERAL TEATIEs v. (V. Mostecky and F. Doyle eds. 1965).
36. H. CHIu, THE CAPACITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO CONCLUDE TREATIES 67
(1966).
37. The sample contains all treaties having three or more States as parties, contained in
the United Nations Treaty Series, and entering into force between 1946 and 1971 (inclu-
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in the United Nations Treaty Series and coming into force from
1946-1971 suggests these six categories:
General Multilaterals Dependent on an International
Organization
Other General Multilateral Treaties
General Multilateral Treaties that Function as Plurilateral Trea-
ties Because of Subject Matter
Plurilateral Treaties Whose Participation is Limited Principally
by Geography
Plurilateral Treaties Whose Participation is Limited Principally
by Interest
Plurilateral Treaties Whose Participation is Limited by a Combi-
nation of Interest and Geography
The first three categories deal with general multilateral trea-
ties; there is little or no restriction of participation. The most in-
teresting of these three categories are those general multilateral
treaties that may be functional plurilateral treaties. There are
nineteen general multilateral treaties that are general because any
State has the right to participate, but that seem to be de facto
plurilateral treaties because a very few States have any realistic
expectation of participation. One could argue about the desirabil-
ity of encouraging universal participation in all general multilateral
treaties. But it is clear that certain nominally general multilateral
treaties cannot, usually because of technology, achieve meaningful
participation from most States.
sive). Technical assistance, mutual assistance and treaties negotiated under the auspices of
the International Labour Organization have been excluded.
19801
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FIGURE I
CATEGORIES OF MULTILATERAL
TREATIES BASED ON LATERALITY
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Figure I illustrates the distribution of multilateral treaties
among the six categories of treaties. In each case, both the actual
number of treaties and the percentage is shown. Overall, plurilater-
als account for seventy percent of the total; this suggests a need for
special attention to this category. The dominant factor in partici-
pation limitation in plurilateral treaties seems to be geography.
About three quarters of plurilaterals rely at least in part on geogra-
phy to limit participation. General treaties comprise only thirty
percent of the total. About one third of this thirty percent is inex-
tricably linked to international organizations. The de facto pluri-
lateral category accounts for only thirty percent of general multi-
lateral treaties. Each of these six categories will now be discussed
in more detail. It should be reemphasized that the focus in each
Multilateral Treaties
case will be the method by which participation is regulated, not
the content of the treaty; although occasionally the two are
interrelated.
A. General Multilateral-Dependent on an International
Organization
It seems that to a degree general multilateral treaties that are
linked to an international organization constitute a separate cate-
gory. Usually these are treaties establishing international organiza-
tions; occasionally, they are new regulations of an organization.
But in all cases these treaties are directly and strongly linked to an
international organization. Two typical examples will suffice. The
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was signed at London in 1945."
The treaty created what has become a very active international or-
ganization. Participation is limited only in the following way:
"[m]embership of the United Nations Organization shall carry
with it the right to membership of UNESCO."8 9 At first blush, this
would seem to create few barriers to universal participation. But it
should be remembered that it is only in the last ten years that the
U.N. has grown to where its membership approximates the entire
world community. There are instances where States have actively
objected to provisions like this claiming they are far too restrictive.
Often these take the form of reservations to the general multilat-
eral treaties containing such provisions. Two examples are the re-
servations by the German Democratic Republic to the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf40 and the People's Republic
of Albania's reservation to the Convention of the non-applicability
of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against human-
ity."1 Another somewhat different example is the Convention of the
World Meteorological Organization signed at Washington in
1947.2 Although the intent is clearly that of a general multilateral
38. Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion, concluded Nov. 16, 1945, 61 Stat. 2495, T.I.A.S. 1580, 4 U.N.T.S. 275.
39. Id. Art. 11.
40. UNITED NATIONS, MuLTTLAnRRAL TREATms IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITORY FUNCTIONS 568 (1979).
41. Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and
crimes against humanity, adopted Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73.
42. Convention of the World Meteorological Organization (with annexes and Protocol
concerning Spain), done Oct. 11, 1947, 1 U.S.T. 281, T.I.A.S. 2052, 77 U.N.T.S. 143.
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treaty, participation is limited to some extent by technology. The
treaty text implies that States must have a meteorological service
in order to join.48 But this remains a general multilateral treaty
because participation restrictions are not severe. Since no stan-
dards are set for domestic meteorological organizations, participa-
tion has been broadly based and includes about one hundred
States.
B. General Multilateral Treaties that are De Facto
Plurilateral Treaties
This category is controversial because it has a developed/de-
veloping State dimension to it. There can be no doubt that certain
treaties, while general multilateral treaties on the surface, are lim-
ited in their application to a few States that are really able to do
what the treaty is trying to regulate. In these instances one would
think that participation by many States is token or vacuous. For
example, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-
tion of the Sea by Oil" seems to have been aimed at a large group
of States; although the text is mute on the participation issue, it
seems certain that it was conceived as a general multilateral treaty.
But most States in the world do not have the oil tankers to comply
with (or thwart) the provisions of the Convention. It clearly has
full applicability only for a small group of States. Perhaps in ac-
knowledgment of this fact, it has been ratified or acceded to by
only forty-five States.
Another good example in this category is the Treaty on princi-
ples governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies."' This
is unmistakably a general multilateral treaty if one relies on the
text which states: "[tihe exploration and use of outer space, includ-
ing the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the
benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their
degree of economic or scientific development. ' '14 The fact remains
however that most of the subjects covered in this treaty have prac-
43. Id. Art. 3.
44. International Convention (with annexes) for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, 1954, done May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
45. Treaty on principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
46. Id. Art. 1.
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tical application for fewer than ten States in the world, often for
only the United States and the Soviet Union. The one exception to
this statement is that the treaty does provide that astronauts shall
be given "all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress,
or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on
the high seas. '47 Thus there may be some theoretical applicability;
but in more than twenty years of space exploration, these provi-
sions have seldom, if ever, been applied. Although this treaty has
some sixty parties, it should be classified as de facto plurilateral by
nature of the content. This raises a broader issue: most treaties
produce different degrees and kinds of obligations on certain of the
parties. The same treaty can create vastly different obligations on
different States. International law largely avoids this important
fact.
C. General Multilateral Treaties-Other
Most general multilateral treaties fall into this "other" cate-
gory, i.e., they are not linked to an international organization and
participation is not severely limited by the substantive terms of
the treaty. In almost all of these cases, participation is open except
for the frequent restriction that States be a member of the U.N. or
one of its specialized agencies. There are over one hundred exam-
ples of such treaties. These five are perhaps typical of the range
and variety:
Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field4s
Convention on the Political Rights of Women'
9
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms 0
Convention on the Continental ShelP
47. Id. Art. 5.
48. Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick
'in armed forces in the field of August 12, 1949, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
49. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar. 31, 1953,
27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
50. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
signed Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
51. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311.
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Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations"
D. Plurilaterals Limited Principally by Geography
The problem with the various categories of plurilateral treaties
is discerning the most important criterion by which participation is
limited. Many do, in fact, have some combination of interest and
geography. Among treaties where geography is the main factor, a
good example is the Agreement concerning cooperation for the sav-
ing of human lives and assistance to vessels and aircraft in distress
in the Black Sea." While there is navigation on the Black Sea by
States from other regions, the wording of the treaty suggests that
only States bordering the Black Sea may become parties." Thus
the limiting factor to participation is largely geography. The 1964
Agreement concerning the Niger River Commission and navigation
and transport on the River Niger" illustrates how the text of a
plurilateral treaty can explicitly limit participation. Only States
that attended "Conference on the Riparian States of the River Ni-
ger"56 may become parties.
E. Plurilateral Limited Principally by Interest
This category contains examples of spectacularly important
treaties, most notably the treaty establishing the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 7 But such treaties are
atypical. The Convention for the regulation of the meshes of fish-
ing nets and the size limits of fish" is an example of a treaty aimed
at a specific interest area and clearly germane only to a small
group of States that fish extensively. Although the text of the
treaty admits participation by any government," the pattern is
52. Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
53. Agreement concerning co-operation for the saving of human lives and assistance to
vessels and aircraft in distress in the Black Sea, Sept. 11, 1956, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics-Bulgaria-Romania, 266 U.N.T.S. 221.
54. Id.
55. Agreement concerning the Niger River Commission and the navigation and trans-
port on the River Niger, done Nov. 25, 1964, 587 U.N.T.S. 19.
56. Id. at 21.
57. Agreement concerning the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), done Sept. 14, 1960, 443 U.N.T.S. 247.
58. Convention (with annexes) for the regulation of the meshes of fishing nets and the
size limits of fish, signed Apr. 5, 1946, 231 U.N.T.S. 199.
59. Id. Art. 15.
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clear that only major fishing States have shown any interest in the
agreement.
When a treaty appeals to States located primarily in one geo-
graphic region, and the limiting factor is interest, it is placed in the
latter category. For example, the Multilateral Convention on the
Association of Spanish Language Academies" has only one party
from outside Latin America (Spain), but the limiting factor is in-
terest in the Spanish language. 61
F. Plurilateral Treaties Limited Both by Interest and
Geography
In ninety-five treaties, geography and interest were so inter-
twined that both clearly limited participation. Two examples will
suffice. The North Atlantic Treaty"2 creating the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) has a geographic focus but also a
compelling security interest. Additional parties are permitted by
unanimous consent of the original parties, but these must be Euro-
pean States." It should be acknowledged that this is one of those
examples where it could be argued that geography is the principal
focus. Another treaty with an unforeseen, infamous future is the
Agreement for mutual defense assistance in Indochina, signed De-
cember 23, 1950." Again the focus is a region, but an important
interest is involved along with participation of States from outside
the region, in this case the United States and France. Since the
text specifically lists the five parties and no mention is made of
wider participation, one assumes that it is limited to these five.65
The point is that a regional focus is coupled with a clearcut inter-
est making it difficult to determine which is the dominant factor in
limiting participation.
It is probable that some disagreement could exist about the
assignment of treaties to one or another of these six categories.
The important point is that the categories do seem to accommo-
60. Multilateral Convention on the Association of Spanish Language Academies, signed
July 28, 1960, 485 U.N.T.S. 3.
61. Id.
62. North Atlantic Treaty, signed Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. 1964, 34
U.N.T.S. 243.
63. Id. Art. 10.
64. Agreement (with annexes) for mutual defense assistance in Indochina, signed Dec.
23, 1950, 3 U.S.T. 2756, T.I.A.S. 2447, 185 U.N.T.S. 3.
65. Id.
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date most treaties. Disagreement about a few treaties would surely
not alter overall conclusions. Dividing treaties among these catego-
ries makes is possible to compare each group according to certain
other characteristics. This can illuminate the nature of the catego-
ries themselves. For example, are plurilateral treaties which came
into force in the 1960's more likely to be limited by geography than
were plurilaterals coming into force during the 1950's?
IV. LATERALITY RELATED TO OTHER TREATY CHARACTERISTICS
Tables I through V compare the categories of multilateral
treaties defined by laterality with certain other important attrib-
utes of treaties. The goal here is to identify differences in the later-
ality categories themselves. For example, are plurilateral treaties
limited principally by geography more likely to use "treaty" as the
instrument name than are mixed plurilateral treaties? Since the
method employed is identical for all five tables, it is desirable to
explain the structure of the tables at the outset. These are contin-
gency tables. This means that each multilateral treaty is classified
according to two characteristics. For example, in Table I, the large
number 15 in the upper left cell means that there are fifteen multi-
lateral treaties that are General Multilaterals Dependent on Inter-
national Organizations and that entered into force from 1946
through 1951. The small numbers surrounding the number of trea-
ties represent percentages. Looking again at the upper left cell in
Table I, the small number 20 to the right means that these fifteen
treaties constitute twenty percent of all General-International
Organization Dependent treaties. In similar fashion, the small 11
below the 15 means that General-International Organization De-
pendent treaties entering into force from 1946 through 1951 consti-
tute eleven percent of all treaties entering into force during that
period. The small number 2 to the left and above the 15 means
that these fifteen treaties constitute two percent of all treaties de-
scribed in the table. Although including these percentages makes
the tables more difficult to read, comparison and analysis is
facilitated.
Table I divides treaties according to force date; thus it should
reveal any trends in the use of the different categories of multilat-
eral treaties. In general the table suggests fairly constant behavior,
i.e., no changes over the twenty-five year period covered. The ex-
ceptions here are the Plurilateral Limited by Geography and the
Plurilateral Limited by Interest categories. The Geography cate-
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gory shows a large increase while the Interest category declines.
This means that since World War II States have shown a marked
tendency to use plurilateral treaties more for geographic reasons
and less for matters defined by interest.
TABLE I
LATERALITY CATEGORIES BY FORCE DATE
DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE
I1957-61 I1962-66 I1967-71
2 2 2 2 2 11
15 20 13 17 17 22 14 19 17 22 76 100
I 1 10 12 9 11 11
I 1 1 13
1 1 3 16 6 32 5 26 4 21 19 100
l 2 4 3 3 3
03 3 0 3 16
26 21 19 16 23 19 30 2S 23 19 12 'oo
20 14 16 19 16 16
4 6 8 10 10 30
26 1o 43 16 60 22 72 26 71 26 272 100
20 32 01 46 47 38
6 6 2 3 2 1740 30 38 26 17 13 22 16 17 13 134 100
31 29 12 14 11 19
3 3 3 2 3 13
22 23 18 19 22 23 15 16 18 19 95 1o0
17 13 15 9 12 13
14.5 20




Table II attempts to determine if certain instrument names
are more frequently selected for certain laterality-defined catego-
ries. It is widely noted that there is no legal distinction between
differently named instruments; but it can be demonstrated that
there are sharp empirical differences.66 It is clear from Table II
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that "convention" and "agreement" are the names most often cho-
sen for each of the six laterality categories. Thus the six differ
most significantly according to the relative use of "agreement" and
"convention." The patterns are clear here. Convention is far and
away the most frequently used instrument name for all general
multilateral treaties except the International Organization Depen-
dent category. All three plurilateral groups use "agreement" most
often as the instrument name. In fact, the differences among the
three plurilateral categories relate to how instrument names are
distributed among the other names besides "agreement." Pluri-
lateral Limited by Geography uses the name "convention" very
TABLE I I
LATERALITY CATEGORIES BY NAME OF INSTRUMENT
Treaty Conventionl Agreement Protocol Exchange Other ITOTALS
2 6 1 0 2 11
2 3 15 20 40 53 5 6 0 0 10 t1 76 100
6 . $ 12 8 0 22 11
1 2 * * 0 0 3
4 21 11 5 3 16 1 5 0 0 0 0 19 100
al 12 6 1 2 0 0 3
0 10 3 3 0 1 17
0 0 69 57 27 22 20 17 0 0 5 4 121100
0 35 a 33 0 8 17
al 1 11 19 2 2 2 30
8 3 75 28 137 50 19 7 17 6 166 272 lo
24 38 42 31 52 25 37
al i 2 10 2 2 3 19
9 7 8 7154 11 14 10 18 13 134 I0o
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heavily (twenty-eight percent), while the others do not. It is inter-
esting that "treaty," the most solemn of instrument names, is used
only thirty-four times. By far the highest percentage of "treaty"
use is for General-De Facto Plurilateral treaties where "treaty"
accounts for twenty-one percent of the cases. But these results
should be viewed with some care, since the absolute numbers are
small.
TABLE III
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190 69 57 21 21 18 2 1 2 1 272 10C
52 28 21 5 22 38
al 10 4 3 2 19
75 66 27 20 18 14 11 8 2 2 133 100






















* = less than
Table III is both the easiest to interpret and the most contro-
versial of the tables. Each treaty has been assigned an importance
index ranging from 1 through 5. These indices, based upon the
content of the treaty, are somewhat subjective. It is clear that the
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data suggest that most treaties are not very important; most are
rated in the lower categories. These results make it possible to cal-
culate an average importance for each category of laterality-de-
fined treaties. This reveals that the only significant importance dif-
ferences come with the Plurilateral Limited by Geography category
which, on the average, is somewhat less important than any of the
other groups. This means that more minor matters are dealt with
by this kind of plurilateral treaty than by any of the other groups.
It must be emphasized that these are averages, so that wide indi-
vidual variation can be expected. For example, it is surely possible
to find individual treaties in this "least important" group that are
themselves highly important.
TABLE IV
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Table IV divides all treaties into four subject categories and
compares these subjects with the laterality categories. It should be
noted that largely military and diplomatic matters are included in
the political category. Overall, most treaties seem to be economic
in nature. Plurilateral treaties are more likely to have sizeable
numbers of political treaties. The De Facto Plurilateral group con-
sists of almost half political treaties, but again this must be viewed
tentatively since the actual numbers are small.
TABLE V
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11
S0 I 1 0 3
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17
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Table V looks at a very important aspect of treaty-making: the
length of time following signature that it takes for a treaty to enter
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force on signature; other treaties, most often general multilaterals,
can take a decade or more. It is evident that the Plurilaterals Lim-
ited by Interest category is the group which States were most anx-
ious to have enter into force quickly-fully sixty-nine percent of
them entered into force within two years of signature. There are
interesting trends evidenced in the General International Organi-
zation (1.0.) Dependent group and in the General Other group.
Both take a considerable length of time, but the 1.0. Dependent
group achieves force mostly during the first four years-three
quarters are in force within three years of signature, even though
only one percent enter into force in less than a year. The General
Other category is distributed over a much longer time interval sug-
gesting hesitance on the part of States to follow through with re-
quired ratifications. This illustrates another point germane to this
entire undertaking. Since it takes such a very long time for ratifica-
tions to materialize, it is impossible to have truly current treaty
data. Often treaty participation patterns do not take shape until
years after signing.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Multilateral treaties represent a dilemma for international
law. While they are one of the most important components of that
law, they are incompletely understood. Almost no scholarly work
has even attempted what could be called a theory of multilateral
treaty-making. It seems highly probable that part of the reason
why there is no theory of multilateral treaty-making is the fact
that scholarship has tended to be intensive, but very narrowly fo-
cused. In a sense, scholarship about multilateral treaties faces a
situation similar to the cartographers of the Middle Ages; there
were excellent, detailed maps of major cities, but neither the peo-
ple nor the resources to draw an accurate global map.
The bridge to a theory of treaty-making can begin by taking a
broader perspective. This article has attempted such a perspective
in the area of laterality. The assumption is made that a wider focus
at least makes it possible to consider theoretical propositions. The
gap that must be crossed to go from treaty-by-treaty analyses to a
general theory is, at present, simply too large. This author pro-
poses that if there are six categories of treaties instead of two, a
theory of treaty-making is possible. But if the dual categorization




The research presented here suggests that it is possible to cat-
egorize treaties, and the six laterality-based categories do exhibit
distinguishing characteristics. The criteria by which participation
is restricted are a fruitful avenue of endeavor for future work. Of
course, other approaches could be taken to the idea of participa-
tion. It would be possible to ask, given the statutory participation
limitations, what portion of those States that could participate
have actually become party to a treaty. This would make it possi-
ble to give a participation ratio for each treaty, a figure that would
probably be of considerable analytical value. If so, it would help to
clarify further the idea of de facto plurilateral treaties.
The moving force behind this work is the belief that interna-
tional law as a discipline has now reached the point where it must
attempt to take a wider view of certain of its important aspects.
Treaties play a vital role in the development of international law.
This makes it essential to have as complete as possible an under-
standing of treaties. Such an understanding must include knowl-
edge of aggregate patterns of treaty behavior, in order to develop a
real theory of treaty-making.
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